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Most corporate venture funds claim they deliver more than returns, but few can prove it. A Merck GHIF managing director lays out why strategic value requires discipline most CVCs lack.
Corporate venture capital has a credibility problem. The pitch is always the same: capital plus strategic alignment, a combination that orthodox venture funds cannot offer. In practice, most CVC programs deliver the capital and struggle to show the strategic part ever materialized.
That gap matters because it's the entire justification for the asset class. A standard venture fund has one job: deploy capital into early-stage companies, help them grow, and exit at a risk-adjusted profit through acquisition or IPO. Corporate venture capital carries a second mandate layered on top, the obligation to generate strategic value for a parent business. According to David M. Rubin, a managing director at Merck GHIF who leads the fund's drug discovery and precision medicine practice, that second mandate is "much easier said than done" and "not well addressed by most CVC funds."
Rubin's framework, drawn from his experience at Merck's global health innovation fund, identifies four practices that separate funds that deliver real strategic value from those that merely write checks with a corporate logo attached.
Financial value has established tools. Discounted cash flow analysis and comparable-company benchmarking give investors a defensible number, even if the inputs rely on projections and assumptions about future pricing. Strategic value has no equivalent instrument. It resists a clean formula.
Rubin offers a useful proxy instead: does the core business actually engage with the portfolio company? Piloting, partnering, licensing, or purchasing its products are observable signals. Absent that engagement, a CVC is "just delivering capital without a strategic return," he writes. That's a hard line, but it draws a sharp distinction between funds that create optionality for the parent company and funds that function as a passive balance sheet allocator with a mission statement attached.
In pharma specifically, strategic value takes a recognizable shape. It might mean a new drug target, a vaccine candidate, a higher probability of pipeline success, lower R&D costs, or faster clinical trials. None of it requires outright acquisition. What it requires is cultivating portfolio companies into standardized, scaled solutions that scientists, regulators, clinicians, and payors can actually use. That's a much higher bar than writing a check and waiting for a markup.
Getting there demands internal plumbing most venture investors never build. Rubin argues that sourcing and diligence need dedicated workstreams with business leaders and subject matter experts inside the parent company, people who can refine use cases and flag unmet needs before a deal gets priced. In-house teams also handle the technical, scientific, and clinical diligence that generalist venture investors are rarely equipped to perform.

This is slow, unglamorous work. Operational discipline, clean communication, and process rigor are not typically what draws people into venture investing. Rubin calls these skills "anathema to the normal concerns of most venture investors." But the payoff compounds: deep internal collaboration raises the odds of success in highly scientific and technical markets, and it means portfolio companies can move faster on pilots and partnerships once the capital lands, because the groundwork for commercial engagement was laid before the term sheet was signed.
Syndication is the third lever, and Rubin frames it as underused. Most CVC teams are built to lead rounds and set pricing themselves. He makes a case for prioritizing syndicate construction instead. Coordinated deals let a fund negotiate terms collectively, divide board responsibilities, and keep future M&A optionality open, all while extending financial reach across a wider range of strategic interest areas. Letting expert financial investors price a syndicated round also tends to produce a fairer market price, and gives the CVC an easy exit ramp if the pricing outruns its own internal modeling.
Reduced board presence does not mean reduced visibility. A fund can stay informed through standard shareholder and information rights, quarterly financials, board materials, and regular check-ins, whether it holds a board seat, an observer seat, or neither. Occasionally a CVC needs to take a heavier hand, placing a convertible note or leading a round outright when the strategic stakes demand it. Rubin is careful to frame that as a temporary posture, one that should come with a plan to delegate responsibility over time rather than entrench the fund as a permanent operator.
None of these four practices, defining strategic value, building internal collaboration, leveraging syndication, and staying engaged through exit, works in isolation. Rubin's argument is that they function as a pattern. Sourcing gets shaped by internal input. Pricing gets sharpened by syndication. Engagement continues all the way through exit rather than stopping once the check clears.
Funds that run this playbook see strategic and financial returns reinforce each other rather than compete for the same scarce attention and capital. That's a notable claim in an industry where CVC programs are often criticized for treating strategic mandate and financial discipline as a zero-sum trade-off, chasing one at the expense of the other.
The deeper point is about talent, not process. Rubin closes on recruiting and training leaders who will "roll up their sleeves" and work seamlessly with internal partners rather than operate as detached capital allocators. For institutional allocators and corporate boards evaluating their own CVC programs, that's the real diagnostic question: does the fund generate engagement from the core business, or does it just generate markups? One of those outcomes compounds strategic advantage over time. The other is simply venture capital wearing a corporate badge, with the additional overhead and governance complexity that implies, and none of the strategic upside the mandate was supposed to deliver in the first place.
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What Corporate Venture Funds Get Wrong about Strategic Value - MedCity News
↗ https://medcitynews.com/2026/10/what-corporate-venture-funds-get-wrong-about-strategic-value
About the author
Marcus began tracking AI's market implications in 2016, noticing AI-related patent filings accelerating ahead of earnings upgrades before most of the sell-side had caught on. A former fixed-income quantitative analyst, he spent two decades building models that priced risk across emerging markets before pivoting to cover the economic impact of AI full-time. His writing translates opaque technical developments into clear risk/reward terms — and he's rarely diplomatic about the gap between AI valuations and underlying fundamentals. He believes most market participants still underestimate AI's long-run deflationary effect on knowledge work.
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